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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
HARRY H.

~fULBACH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case 9959

vs.

W. LYNN HERTIG,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING ON
THE SUDDEN EMERGENCY DOCTRINE.
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DEFINE
IN THE INSTRUCTIONS WHAT WAS AN IMMEDIATE
HAZARD.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT EACH DRIVER HAD A DUTY TO
KEEP A LOOKOUT AND THAT IT WAS NEGLIGENCE TO
FAIL TO SEE WHAT WAS PLAIN TO BE SEEN.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE
SHOWED AS A MATTER OF LAW THE PLAINTIFF WAS
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO YIELD
THE RIGHT OF WAY AND IN FAILING TO KEEP A
PROPER LOOKOUT.
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CARE
This is an action for personal injuries and property
damage arising out of a roll-over of plaintiff's truck
without a collision between vehicles.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
The lower court denied the defendant's motions for (a)
a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, (b) a new
trial, and (c) a judgment in favor of the defendant "No
Cause of Action" non obstante veredicto.
R,ELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
(1) The defendant seeks an order from this court
directing the lower court to enter a judgment in favor
on the defendant and against the plaintiff notwithstanding the jury verdict.
(2) Or, if this court does not direct the lower court
to enter a judgment in favor of the defendant, then an
order to the lower court granting the defendant a new
trial on proper instructions.
BTA'TEl\iEN'T OF MATERIAL FACTS
The vehicles did not collide . This lawsuit involves
an accident which occurred on March 15, 1962 (R. 184)
at a,bout 6:38 P.l\I. (R. 126). The accident happened at
the X shaped intersection of 'Thirteenth East and the
Cottonwood Diagonal in Salt Lake County (R. 126).
The accident, according to l\ir. Muhlbach, took place
during the daylight when visibility was excellent (R.
161). Prior to the accident Mr. Muhlbach was driving
2
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in a

northwP~tPrly

direction on the Cottonwood Diagonal
(It 1-l-7) at an admitted speed of -!0 m.p.h. (R. 1-!8).
~I r. Hertig was driving north on Thirteenth East
in a white and light green model Oldsmobile (R. 186).
lmnwdiah_•ly behind ~I r. Hertig's car was a red convertible driven by James R. Cordell (R. 201 & R. 205).
\?isibility was unobstructed (Exhibits 6-D, 4-D, 3-D, 2-D
& Officer lba R. 180). Jed K. ~lcl\Iillan, a color-blind
gentleman (R. 279), was going southeast on the Cottonwood Diagonal and when about ten car lengths northwest
of the intersection observed Mr. Mulbach's truck approaching as a ear entered the intersection. Mr. Mc~lillan was unable to tell (R. 278) whether the ear entering from the south stopped at the stop sign. ~Ir. Hertig
testified he stopped at the stop sign facing south twentyfive to thirty seconds and that there was no other vehicle
ahead of hiin going north at the stop sign (R. 219). Mr.
l\Ic>l\fillan, plaintiff's witness, failed to see any vehicle
stopped at the stop sign ahead of Mr. Hertig going north
(R. ~5 & R. 278), hut apparently did see Mr. Cordell
drive into the intersection (R. 278).
~Ir. Cordell in the car behind Mr. Hertig testified
.Mr. Hertig stopped at the stop sign facing north, and
that he observed him stopped as he approached from the
south, and that he sat behind l\Ir. Hertig's car for some
twenty to twenty-five seconds (R. 202), and that there
were no vehicles ahead of Mr. Hertig going north (R.
20:2).
~Ir. ~Iuhlbach, going northwest on the Cottonwood
Diagonal, placed a phantom vehicle, or at least one not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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seen by any other witness, ahead of l\[r. Hertig's ear
(R. 148) entering the intersection .ahead of l\ir. Hertig's
auto. Mr. Muhlbach said he was not positive of the color
(R. 161) of the vehicle ahead of Mr. Hertig but believed
it was an old model vehicle that was brown, green, or
maybe black (R. 161). On one occasion Mr. Muhlbach
claimed Mr. Hertig followed this vehicle into the intersection (R. 162) and that Mr. Hertig slowed down to
maybe three miles per hour before entering the intersection. Mr. Muhlbach said, when he saw the vehicle
which he identified as Mr. Hertig's, it was two or three
hundred feet back from the stop sign (R. 166) to the
south, and from that time he observed it .and noted the
driver did not look back over his shoulder to the southeast (R. 167). Mr. Muhlbach claims that he was watching
this driver close enough so that if he had looked back
toward him he would have observed this driver looking
(R. 167).
But on cross examination (R. 168) Mr. Muhlbach
admitted that the car he identified as Mr. Hertig's
slowed up and stopped with the front of it right even
with the stop sign facing the intersection (R. 168). The
question asked Mr. Muhlbach was:
Q. "Will you say the spot he slowed up there and
stopped was right even with the stop sign,
with the front of the car~"
A.

"Approximately right around there, yes."

Mr. Muhlbach could not identify any vehicle as
being behind the vehicle he identified as belonging to
Mr. Hertig (R. 168).
4
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\tVith rPg-ard to the speed of the vehicle which Mr.
Muhlbach identified as :Mr. Hertig's, he could not say
whether it was going faster or slower than 15 m.p.h. at
tlw time it turned to go northwest on the Cottonwood
Diagonal, as he was not observing enough to judge the
speed (R. 164).
l\[ r. Ilertig testified (R. 219) he made a complete

stop with the front of his car even with the
that he looked and saw nothing coming from
east on the Cottonwood Diagonal, and that
cars going toward the southeast passed, he
into the intersection (R. 220).

stop sign,
the southaftPr two
proceeded

On exhibition 9-D· (R. 220) Mr. Hertig placed a red
crayon mark to show where his car was in the intersection when he turned to go northwest on the Cottonwood Diagonal. Mr. Hertig said at the time he made the
turn indicated by the red mark in the intersection on
exhibit 9-D, he was going 15 miles per hour or at the
most 20 miles per hour at the time he began the turn.
l\Ir. Cordell, the independent witness in the car behind :Mr. Hertig testified that Mr. Hertig made a complete stop at the stop sign for 20 to 25 seconds and then
proceeded ahead to make a left turn in a normal manner
(R. 202) and was going 15 to 20 miles per hour at the
most when he started the left turn, and that Mr. Hertig's
car was 1.50 feet west of the intersection when he observed the truck turned over. Mr. Hertig did not see
plaintiff's truck until :JI r. Cordell told him of the accident.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Exhibit 9-D was prepared by W. Y. Tipton and on
the scale 1 inch equals 10 feet.
Sgt. E. M. Pitcher, Utah Highway Patrol, testified
that it was 12lf2 inches on exhibit 9-D or 125 feet from
the stop sign where Mr. Hertig stopped the front of his
car to the place where the turn began. Mr. Hertig's
turn is shown by the red mark on exhibit 9-D (R. 243 &
R. 244). Further, Sgt. E. M. Pitcher stated (R. 244),
assuming that Mr. Hertig stopped at the stop sign and
then proceeded ahead and that the speed of his car did
not exceed 20 miles per hour at the time he started the
turn, it would have taken 8lf2 seconds for Mr. Hertig to
reach the point in the intersection where he started the
turn (R. 244). Sgt. E. M. Pitcher stated that at the time
Mr. Hertig's auto left the stop sign, assuming that Mr.
Muhlbach's truck was going 40 miles per hour, that the
truck would have been going 58.8 feet per second and
that the truck was 499.8 feet from the place where the
turn was started at the time Mr. Hertig left the stop
sign (R. 245). Further, Sgt. Pitcher said that if the
truck of Mr. Muhlbach had been going 50 nriles per hour,
it would have been 624.75 feet from where the turn was
started at the time Mr. Hertig left the stop sign.
Mr. Iba, one of the investigating officers, testified
that the intersection was dry, hard and fairly level asphalt and that he did not observe any sand or gravel in
the intersection when he arrived to investigate (R. 181).
Mr. Iba also testified that at the scene of the accident
6
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"il/r. Jlnhlbach told him he d,id not obserH' the dangn·

until he was 30 feet from the car he identified as being
Mr. Hertig's'' (R. 181).
The testimony of ~fr. Iba was as follows (R. 181):
Q. "And Mr. Muhlbach told you that he did not
observe the danger of this thing until he was
30 feet from ~1r. Hertig's automible 1"
A. "That's right, sir."
Q. "At the time he said he was going 35 or 40
miles an hour1"
A. "Yes."
Officer Iba also stated that at the scene of the
accident Thlr. nlulhbach did not tell him of any vehicle
proceeding into the intersection ahead of Thlr. Hertig
(R. 181). ~fr. ~[uhlbach did not deny his statement
to Officer Iba.
Officed :Morgan assisted Officer Iba with the investigation (R. 126). He made a free hand drawing,
Exhibit 1-P and measured the roadways. Officer Thlorgan shows on Exhibit 1-P that east of the intersection
the Cottonwood Diagonal was 36' 10" from one edge of
the pavement to the other. He found that Thirteenth
East was :25' wide from one pavement edge to another. He also found that the first stress mark left
from the tires on Mr. Thiulbach's truc:k started 13' 3" east
of the east edge of the pavement, and it was 140' to
the rear of l\Ir. Muhlbach's truck to where the stress
marks started 13' 3" east of the east edge of the pavement of Thirteenth East.
Officer l\Iorgan said the stress marks indicated that
~Ir. Muhlbach's truck started to swerve to the north (R.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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127). Mr. Morgan also stated that for all practical pur~
poses the intersection was level (R. 129), both roads were
in good condition, were straight, and there was no
obstruction to visibility on the southeast corner (R. 130).
Officer Morgan's drawing, Exhibit 1-P, was not drawn
to scale (R. 132).
On cross-examination Officer Morgan identified exhibits 2-D to 6-D, inclusive, and said at the time of the
investigation the road was dry, there was no condition on the roadway which would make braking difficult
(R. 139'), and the roadways were level and in good condition (R. 139 & R. 140).
Mr. Muhlbaeh testified that the brakes of his truck
were good (R. 164) and that as soon as he saw the vehicle
was in front of him, he reacted to avoid it (R. 165).
Further, Mr. 1\tiuhlhach stated that in his opinion he had
better than average reactions when he grabbed the wheel
and swerved to miss the vehicle in front of him (R.
165).
Returning to Sgt. E. M. Pitcher, he testified that
on the morning of the trial he ran a coefficiency test of
the friction of the roadway and found the lowest drag
factor would be .84 on the Cottonwood Diagonal (R,. 284
& R. 290). Further, Sgt. Pitcher stated (R. 291 & 292),
assuming that Mr. ~fuhlhach's vehicle was going 40 miles
per hour on the Cottonwood Diagonal, that the roadway
was dry, there were no loose 1naterials on it, and that
the drag-factor was .84, that from his studies and tests
he round it would be reasonabJe for the truck to stop
8
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in 63lj2 feet of braking, and that if you a~~nmed reaction time of ~4 of one ~econrl, during that period
at 40 miles per hour the truck would have traveled 44.1
feet and the total stopping distance for reaction time
and braking would be 107 feet.
Sgt. Pitcher also testified (R. 293) that a vehicle
equipped with brakes having a braking efficiency of .435
would not have good braXes but that such brakes would
meet minimun1 standards, and that with such brakes (R.
294) the total braking distance would be 122.6 feet and
the total stopping distance with % of one second for
reaction time at 40 miles per hour would be 166.7 feet
(R. 294).
At the request of plaintiff's counsel (R. 46) and
over defendant's objection (R. 301), the court gave Instruction No. 16 (R. 94) on the emergency doctrine.
Instruction No. 16 given was as follows:
No. 16
"One who, in a sudden emergency, acts according to his best judgment, or who, because of
lack of time to form a judgment, omits to act in
the n1ost judicious manner, is not chargeable with
contributory negligence, provided he exercises in
the emergency the care of a reasonable prudent
individual under like circumstances.
"In such a situation, his duty is to exercise
only the degree of care which an ordinary prudent
person would exercise under the same or similar
circumstances. If, at that moment, he exercises
such care, he does all the law requires of him,
even though, in the light of after-events, it might
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appear that a different choice and manner of action would have been better and safer."
Counsel for Mr. Hertig requested that the court
give an instruction defining "Immediate Hazard" to the
jury (R. 65). Defendant's requested Instruction No. 13
was not given (R. 65) and no place in the charge to the
jury (R. 78 to R 106) did the court define· jmmediate
hazard. Requested Instruction No. 13 from the defendant, Mr. Hertig, read as follows (R. 65):
No. 13
"The driver of a vehicle entering a highway
must stop and defer to all vehicles that would be
required to brake sharply or suddenly to avoid
a collision. If, however, the vehicle on a through
highway is far enough away to have a clear margin to observe and mruke a smooth and safe stop,
the driver on the through highway is not an immediate hazard, and the driver entering the
through highway from a stop sign need not yield
to the driver of a vehicle on a through highway,
and the driver entering the through highway has
the right of way."
Likewise Defendant's requested Instructions No. 14
and No. 16 were refused. (R. 66 and R. 68)
No. 14
"Where the driver of a truck has an1ple time
to observe a motorist entering the through
highway and fails to do so in time to avoid an
accident, the driver of the truck is guilty of contributory negligence."
No. 16
"You are instructed that the driver on an

10
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arterial highway has the duty to remain reasonably alert to the possibility that a driver entering the arterial highway at an intersection may
believe that he can enter in safety.
"The duty to keep a proper lookout applies to
rarh driver, and neither driver can excuse his
failure to observe the other driver because the
other driver failed to observe him.
''Failure to see what is plain to be seen in
'negligence'."
There was no othe-r traffic moving in or about to
enter this unobstructed intersection.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING ON
THE SUDDEN EMERGENCY DOCTRINE.

'The plaintiff, Mr. Muhlbach, did not observe the
danger of colliding with ~[r. Hertig's automobile until
he was 30 feet from it, and at a time when he was going
35 or 40 miles per hour (R. 181). :Mr. ~Iuhlbach never
did apply his brakes but swerved to the north on seeing
Mr. Hertig's automobile and left stress marks that
started 13' 3" east of the east edge of the pavement
on Thirteenth East. At the scene of the accident
:\lr. ~[uhlbach admitted to Officer Iba (R. 181) that
he was going 40 miles per hour or 58.8 feet per second
at the ti1ne he observed the danger. At that speed
during ;4, of a second reaction time he had traveled 44.1
feet. and because of his failure to keep a lookout for
vehicles reasonably to be expected in the intersection,
he did not have time to slow or stop his truck, and so he
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stated he swerved to the north to go north on Thirteenth
East, but Exhibit 1-P shows that he turned too late and
turned off Thirteenth East on the west side of the roadway north of the intersection.
Mr. Hertig contends that if the emergency or danger
was created by JJir. 1Jf1thlbach that he can not claim the
b·enefit of the emergency doctrine, and further ~lr. Her-

tig contends that the instruction given was not a proper
statement of the law relating to "emergency doctrine"
and its use or application.
In Nikoleropoulos vs. Ramsey (1923) 61 Utah 465.
214 P. 2d 304, where an action was brought for injuries
sustained by a pedestrian who was overtaken .and struck
down on a dark rainy night b~~ the defendant driver who
was driving at a speed of 12 miles per hour when he
could only see 6 feet ahead, and who admitted that at the
speed he was driving there was not time to stop after
he saw the pedestrian who was walking on the edge of
the blacktop or next to the shoulder of the road, and
where the court instructed on the "sudden emergency
doctrine," and plaintiff's counsel objected to the insruction, and on appeal the objection to the instruction was
upheld by the court, the court said :
"We are of the opinion the instruction was
not applicable to the instant case. The presence
of a pedestrian on the highway at the point in
question was reasonably to be anticipated. Beside
this, we are of the opinion, as a matter of law,
under facts disclosed by the record that at the
time of the injury, and immediately before, de-

12
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fen dan t was not l'XPrcising reasonable care in the
operation of his car, and if any e1nergency existed,
it was entirely due to his own negligence."
Siko/ernpoulos 1·s. Ramse.'J, supra, involvPs the ~mne
type of situation from which defendant appeals. Because
of Mr. Muhlbach's speed of 40 miles per hour on the
Cottonwood Diagonal, he eould not stop when he observed the danger 30 feet ahead of him.
The instruction given did not caution the jury that
the emergency 1nust be one which arose without fault on
the part of Mr. Muhlbach. 'The instruction given on the
"emergency doctrine" took the question of contributory
negligence completely out of the lawsuit.
In Gittens vs. Lundberg (1955) 3 Utah 2d 392, 28-1
P. :2d 1115, where on appeal the plaintiff complained of
the trial court's refusal to give a request of the instruction on ''sudden emergency," the court said there was no
error co1n1nitted. In Gittens vs. Lundberg, supra, the
court said the request did not properly state the law because it did not state the requisite element of the emergnecy that is must be one which arose without fault on the
part of the plaintiff, and said that when the plaintiff
creates peril by his own fault, he may not thereafter urge
sudden emergency doctrine to protect hiinself from the
charge of contributory negligence.
Instruction No. 16 failed to caution the jury that the
emergency doctrine did not apply unless the emergency
arose without fault on the part of the plaintiff.

In Ferguson vs. Jongsm-4 (1960) 10 Utah 2d 179,
350 P. 2d -10-1, where a proposed instruction copied from
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Jury Instruction Forms for Utah, No. 17>.-t charged that
a person who, without negligence on his part is suddenly
and unexpectedly confronted with .apparent or imrninent
peril, is not required to use the same prudence or good
judgment as would otherwise be expected. This court
said Jury Instruction Forms for lTtah, K o. 15.4 was a
correct statement of the law as .applied to the facts of
that case.
In Howard vs. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., (1954) 2
Utah 2d 65, 269 P. 2d 295, the court said the emergency
or sudden or unexpected happening must not he caused
by fortious conduct by the party claiming the benefit
of the emergency doctrine. And then on the facts of that
case reasoned that the emergency was not caused by the
negligence or tortious conduct of Mr. Byington.
In Red.d vs. Airway 11! otor Coach Lines (1943) 104
Utah 9, 137 P. 2d 374, where the evidence showed that the
decedent rode out onto the highway from the private
driveway and that the bus driver swerved to his right
across the curbing to avoid a collision but did not stop
because the air-brakes were damaged crossing the curbing, the court gave an instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine, and this court said that where the
emergency or condition was not caused by a party claiming benefit of doctrine and not caused by tortious conduct
a party that requested instruction it was properly given.
Instruction No. 15.4 Jury Instruction Forms for
Utah compares with the B.A.J.I. Instruction Form No.
137. It would appear Utah Instruction on Sudden Emergency may have been adopted from California.
14
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l.n Jones l's, llriurich (19-f~) -!9 C.al. ..:\pp. 2d 70~,
1~~ P. :2d 30-f, when the trial judge granted a new trial,
the Di~tr·id Court of ...\ ppeals for· the Third District of
California affirmed an order granting the new trial
where the emergency instruction was given, and it is this
dP(·i~ion which appears to have had the foundation for
B.A.J.I. Instruction No. 137.
In Jones vs. Heinrich supra, the following instruction was given:
"If you find from the evidence in this case
that the defendant Fred C. Heinrich, was suddenly confronted with unexpected and imminent
danger, either to himself or to another, then he
was not expected nor required to use the same
judgment and prudence that would have been required of him in the exercise of ordinary care in
calmer and more deliberate moments. His duty
was to exercise only that ·mnount of care which
an ordinarily prudent person would exercise if
confronted with the same unexpected danger
under the same circumstances.''
\Vith regard to the forgoing instruction in Jones vs.
H eint'ich, supra, the court said:
"It will be observed that the instruction omits.
the qualification that the defendant, Heinrich,
must not have been placed in -a position of unexpected and im1ninent danger through any fauit
or negligence on his part. ·Plaintiff requested
and the court gave an instruction with reference
to the imminent peril doctrine as applied to the
decedent which contained the limitation 'Without
fault or negligence on her part.' Thus, it will
be seen that the instruction complained of was
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doubly prejudicial to the plaintiffs as the defendant was given the benefit of the rule, if confronted
with sudden danger, while plaintiffs were not.
Appellant contends that other instructions given
on the question of negligence cure the error, if
any, in the instruction complained of, citing authorities in support thereof. However, under the
facts in t!1e instant case, which disclose the main
issue .to be the question of negligence and contributory negligence, and to which the instruction
was particularly applicable, the omission of the
limitation was prejudicially erroneous to the
plaintiff's case. Gootar vs. Levin, 109 Cal. App.
703, 293 P. 706; Howard vs. Worthington, 50 Cal.
App. 556, 195 P. 709; SteAaley vs. Chessum, 123
Cal. App. 446, 11 P. 2d 428.
In California in Edgett vs. Fairchild (1957) Cal. App.
2d 734, 314 P. 2d 973, where plaintiff sought to invoke
doctrine of sudden emergency or imminent peril at the
time they were passing an intersection, the court said
that one invoking the doctrine must have been free from
negligence placing him in the orbit of peril.
In New l\Iexico in Otero vs. Phys.icians & Surgeons
Ambulance Service, Inc. (1959) 65 N.M. 319, 336 P. 2d
1070, the Supreme Court of New Mexico specifically approved of an instruction on unexpected peril, where the
instruction began as our J.I.F.U. Form 15.4 does with
the phrase, "a person, wlio without negligence on his
part is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with a
peril." In the following case, Jlontoya vs. Winchell
(1961), 69 N.M. 177, 3-64 P. 2d 104, the New l\1exico Court
held the trial court could properly refuse a requested
16
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instruction on unexpech•d peril where the request failed
to quali l'y its use and show that it wa~ only a circulnstance to be considered to determine if reasonable care
was exercised.
ln \Vis<·<m~in in Lentz L's. S orthzveste rn . Yational
Cttsl(o/ty Co. (19<H) 11 \Vis. ~d -Hi:Z, 105 X.,V. 2d 759,
where evidence showed the driver was proceeding along
the street in the dark during fog and did not see a truck
which was parked with taillight illuminated until he was
25 to 30 feet away from it, and thereafter was unable
to avoid striking it, the court said the driver was negligent as to lookout or speed, or both, and was not entitled
to the benefit of "sudden emergency" doctrine, and that
the <'<>Urt committed reversible error in instructing on
doctrine of sudden emergency, and the court said any
person \Vhose negligence contributes to, or helps to create
the emergency is not entitled to the benefit of the rule,
and the jury in 1nany cases should be so advised.
lnA11draski vs. Gormley (1958), 3 Wis, ~d 149,
87 N.S. 818, the court said that where an emergency

existed because of a driver's failure to keep a proper
loo~out, he did not come within the emergency rule and
was not entitled to an instruction on emergency doctrine.
lnAndraski vs. Gormley, supra, the defendant driver

failed to see a stalled car and ran into a driver who
was attempting to change a flat on the highway.
In ~Iississippi in Pullin lis. Nabors (1961), 240 ~Iiss.
864, 128 So. 2d 117, in a situation where the defendant
sa.w the danger or a red light while still a quarter of a
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mile from the scene of the accident, but did nothing about
slowing up, an instruction on the "sudden mnergency"
doctrine was given, and the Supreme Court reversed the
judgment for the defendant driver, saying the sudden
emergency was of the driver's own rnaiking in that he
failed to slow his car or get it under control before arriving at the scene of the prior accident, and a new trial
was granted for the plaintiff.
In Michigan in Garvit vs. Krebs (1953), 338 ~1ich.
256, 61 N .M. 2d 58, where an action was brought for
personal injuries received in an intersection collision
and where an instruction of doctrine of "sudden emergency" failed to state the qualifications on the use of
that doctrine to the effect that the situation must be one
not brought about by plaintiff's own negligence, the court
held the giving of the instruction was prejudicial error
and granted a reversal and a new trial to the defendant.
Again in Hicks vs. B & B D,istributors, Inc. (1958), 353
Mich. 488, 9'1 N. W. 2d 882, where action was brought for
wrongful death when auto plaintiff was in was struek
from the rear at stop light and the charge on sudden
emergency failed to state to the jury that a party is
entitled to the benefit of the rule only if the emergency occurs through no fault or negligence of his,
the court said it was error to give the struction and
granted a reversal.
In Oregon in Stose vs. Het"nr.ich (1953), 199 Ore.
386, 261 P. 2d 675, the Oregon Court stated that the instruction on "sudden emergency" should show that it
18
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would not be effPdive unless the driver who is claiming
the sudden emergency was confronted with an e1nergency
through no fault or negligence on his part.
ln 'fexas in Oru.se vs. DaHiels (1956). Tex. Civ. App.
293 S.W. 2d 616, where a requested instruction by the
automobile driver for emergency failed to state that an
"emergency" was a condition arising suddenly and unt>xpectedly and not caused by any negligent act or mnission by the person in question, the court held the instruction failed to meet the requirements of the emergency
doctrine, and that it was not error to reffuse to give the
instruction.
In a case from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
Howard vs. Cincinn.ati Sheet Metal & Roofing Co., (1956)
7th C.C.A. 234 F. 2d 233, where an action was brought
for injuries to a passenger in an auto colliding with the
corporate defendant's automobile driven by defendant's
employee, an instruction to the jury to the fact that de·fendant's O:river had to act suddenly in emergency, without opportunity for deliberation, was a circumstance to
be considered in determining what was ordinary care
under the circumstances, was held to be error prejudicial
to plaintiff where one of the most important questions to
be resolved by the jury was whether emergency situation
was created by such driver's acts or by the driver of the
auto in which the plaintiff was riding.
A general discussion of the subject of the emergency
doctrine is found in 80 AL.R. 2d 6.
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The lower court should not have permitted the
plaintiff to invoke the doctrine of sudden emergency unless the court or the jury found ~1r. ~1uhlbach was free
from negligence placing him in the orbit of peril. Further,
it is undisputed that the evidence in this case is to the
effect that plaintiff's vehicle came into the intersection
at a speed of 35 or 40 miles per hour (R. 181). As Mr.
Muhlbach approached the interesection, he had an unobstructed view of the stop sign of the intersection that
Mr. Hertig had to travel in proceeding to go northwest
on the Cottonwood Diagonal. It is 125 feet from the stop
sign to weher Mr. Hertig turned to go northwest, and it
took Mr. Hertig 8lj2 seconds to reach the place where he
turned, starting at a zero speed and going up to a maximum of 20 miles an hour. Going from the stop sign to
the place where the turn was started :Mr. Hertig traveled
an average speed of 10 miles per hour or 14.7 feet per
second (R. 244). Sgt. Pitcher divided 14.7 into 125 feet
and fonud that 8¥2 seconds were involved going from the
stop that Mr. Hertig made (R. 168) to where the red
crayon mark was made on Exhibit 9-D. In % of a sec-:
ond reaction time !1r. Muhlbach's vehicle would have
traveled 44.1 feet at 40 miles per hour. Since Mr. Muhlbach admitted he did not see the danger until he was 30
feet from it, he surely was in an emergency situation
and certainly the en1ergency was created for hi1n by his
own lack of lookout, and undoubtedly under the existing
circumstances he should not have been permitted to evoke
the emergency doctrine as stated by the court.
Mr. Muhlbach stated that he had good brakes and
20
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that hP had better than usual rt>ad ion time ( R. U ;~))
and that he ~wPrvPd because lw could not slow or
:-;top. ~gt. Pit<'IH'r tP~tified (R. :2~)1 and R. :2!):2), a:-;:-;uming that l\1 r. l\1 uhlbach was going 40 n1iles per hour
on the Cottonwood Diagonal, that the roadwa~· was dry,
and there were no loose materials on it, and that the
drag-factor was .S-!, that from his studies and tests he
found it would be reasonablle to stop a truck in 63¥2
ft>t't of braking and -+-+.1 feet of reaction ti1ne or in a
total stopping distance of 107 feet. However, because of
hu·k of loakout, 1\Ir. l\Iuhlbach allowed himself only 30
feet and could not stop or brake safely and control his
tntck, and he need a total of l 07 feet in which to stop
with good brakes, but lH', through his own lack of observations, had allowed only 30 feet. Is is reasonable that
under these eircumstances he be pennitted to invoke the
emergency doctrine without it being stated that he i~ not
entitled to the benefits of the doctrine unless he is without negligence on his part as the doctrine is stated in
Jury Instructions Utah 15.4t
l\[r. Hertig contends that the court erred in instructing on the doctrine of sudden emergency because the
evidence shows that Mr. Muhlbach did not see the danger
until he was 30 feet away, and that further the court erred in not stating the doctrine correctly, as a person may
only invoke it who is without negligence on his part. The
trial court, on giving Instruction No. 16, committed prejudicial error and this court in reviewing the Inatter
should consider the case in the light Inost favorable for
lfr. Hertig, the party objecting to the instruction.
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Further, if the plaintiff argues that other testimony
other than his own was more favorable to him than that
came from himself on one occasion, the court should keBp
in mind that the trial court in reviewing a motion for
a new trial or a motion for a directed verdict or a motion
for a "Judgment of No Cause of Action" N.O.V. may
consider such testimony true as hears most strongly
against the interest of the plaintiff, and that merely because the plaintiff's own testimony presents a choice of
probabilities that the plaintiff is not entitled to the most
favorable probability, and as authority for this proposition the court's attention is called to the cases of Fou·ler
vs. Pleaswnt Valley Coal Co. (1898), 16 Utah 348, 52 P.
594, Alvar;ado vs. Tucker (1954), 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.
2 986. It is submitted that one who is not keeping a
lookout cannot claim a sudden emergency because of lack
of time.
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DEFINE
IN THE INSTRUCTIONS WHAT WAS AN IMMEDIATE
HAZARD.

No instruction was given by the court defining an
"immediate hazard," an~ the jury had no guide to tell
them or tests to use in determining what was or what
was not an immediate hazard. l\1:r. Hertig requested the
court to give an instruction defining immediate hazard
(R. 65) and this request was refused (R~ 65). Defendant's requested Instruction No. 13 set forth in R. 65 was
ta1ken fromRi:chards vs. Anderson (1959) 9 Ftah 2d 17,
337 P. 2d 59. In Richa1rds vs. Anderson this court s.aid:

22
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"It is clear that the defendant entered the
intersection considerably ahead of the plaintiff.
The que~tion then becomes whether plaintiff's
automobile was so close to the inte-rsection to
constitute an 'immediate hazard' to defendant
when thP latter entered the intersection. There is,
of course, no precise set of measurements by
which an immediate hazard can be gauged. It
must be judged on the basis of common sense in
the light of existing circumstances. In reference
to a similar situation the Supreme Court of Delaware has said that an 'im1nediate hazard' is
created when a vehicle approaches an intersection
on a favored street at a reasonable speed under
such circumstances that, if the disfavored driver
proceeds into the intersection it will force the
favored driver to sharply and suddenly check his
progress or stop in order to avoid collision. Conversely, if the disfavored driver has made his
stop and deferred to all vehicles that would be
required to go into a sharp or sudden braking to
avoid collision, the cars far enough away have
a clear margin to observe and make a smooth and
safe stop are not an 'immediate hazard' and are
required to yield to the driver already at the
intersection.

"An analysis of the time, speed, and distance
factors shows plainly that the plaintiff had more
than ample time to 01bserve the defendant and
avoid collision with him. After defendant had
waited at the entrance to the intersection and allowed others cars to go by, and cars in the outside
and center lanes had stopped and deferred to
him, he traveled 38 feet, reaching the speed of 5
to 10 m.p.h. Computing his average speed between zero at stop to his maximum acceleration
23
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of 10 m.p.h. equals 5 m.p.h.; at which he would
. to
travel about' 7¥2 feet per second, amountmg
just about 5 seconds elapsed time in the intersection. During that time the plaintiff, even at the
minimum speed of 15 m.p.h or 22.5 feet per second,
would have traveled 112.5 feeet. (He was actually
traveling a good deal faster because his own
statement says he was decelerating.) At the speed
of 15 m.p.h., in his reaction time of three-fourths
second, he would travel 16lj2 feet and require 18
feet for stopping with only passable brakes. This
makes a total of stopping distance of 34.5 feet,
leaving a margin of 78 feet. For any increase
in plaintiff's speed, his distance away and his
opportunity to stop increase proportionately.
"The plaintiff advances the excuse that the
two cars stopped in the lanes to his right obscured his view of the defendant. The fact is that
these cars are each about six feet wide. They
thus occupied only two such spots in a total of
33 feet. While it was necessary for plaintiff to be
watching his own lane ahead, his vision was not
like looking through a pipe or a tunnel. His angle
of vision would take in the moving objects in the
adjacent lanes, particularly a moving object such
as defendant's car, had he been looking."
In Hickok vs. Skinner (1948), 113 Utah 1, 190 P. 2d 514,
where the plaintiff was traveling north on West Temple
in Salt Lake City, at the interesection of 21st South and
the, defendant was going west on 21st South, and ,,-here
the plaintiff admitted he saw the defendant's vehicle 400
or 500 feet east at the time he left the stop sign to cross
21st South, and proceeded without looking to the east
again, and where 21st South was 63 feet wide, and the
24
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block along ~1st South along which the defendant was
traveling was 660 feet long, and the point of itnpact was
18 feet ~outh of the north rurb of ~1st South and 9 feet
west of the east curb of \Vest Temple and 65 feet north
from the stop sign facing 21st South by which the
plaintiff entered the intersection, and where the police
officer testified the defendant was going -!5 m.p.h. in
a 35 m.p.h. zone, and where there were no s:kid marks, the
court said if the distance were 400 feet, the defendant
had to travel, going at a speed of -l-5 m.p.h., six seconds
to reach the point of collision, and if it were 500 feet
a way, it would have taken 7lj2 seconds for the defendant's car to reach the point of i1npact from the
time the plaintiff's car left the stop sign, and it cannot be said that the defendant's car could have been
approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate
hazard. Therefore, the defendant was required to yield
the right-of-way to the plaintiff.
Obviously, H·ickok t~s. Skinucr, supra, is authority
to the effect that if a car on the arterial is between six
or seven and one-half seconds away from the point of
impact at the time the other vehicle leaves the stop sign,
it is not so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.
And Richards ~·s. Anderson, supra, is authority that if
a vehicle on the arterial is five seconds away from the
point of impact at the time the vehicle leaves the stop
sign, the vehicle on the arterial is not so close as
to constitute an immediate hazard. In reviewing a request for failure to give a requested instruction, it is
25
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the duty of the court to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party offering the requested instruction. Wolfsmith vs. Marsh (1959), 5- Cal. Repts. 2d
832, 337 p. 2d 70.
In Richards vs. Anderson, supra, in defining an
immediate hazard this court adopted the rule of Fusco
vs. Dauphin (1950), S Terr. 140, 47 Del. 140, SS Atl. 2d
813, where this court apparently recognized that a better
definition of "immediate hazard" was required. In Fusco
vs. Dauphin we have specific and accurate definition
of "immediate hazard."
If the Supreme Court used the yardstick set forth
in Fusco vs. D,auphin supra, to measure immediate
hazard, why shouldn't the jury in this case have been
permitted to use the same yardstick in measuring
"immediate hazard"~ I submit that the jury should have
been entitled to use the same yardstick as a guide to
what was an inunedia te hazard, and yet when the jury
was not given a definition of "immediate hazard" it was
left to guess as to what was and was not an "immediate
hazard" and since the accident occurred immediately following the entry they assumed erroneously there was
"immediate hazard" when in fact there was not.
Sgt. Pitcher, in calculating the time from the stop
sign to the point where Mr. Hertig began his left turn,
used the same method as this court in Richards vs.
Anderson, supra. He found that starting from the zero
speed and reaching a maximum of 20 m.p.h. the most unfavorable speed to Mr. Hertig, the .average speed would
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havt> been 10 tniles per hour, or that the average speed
per :·wcond of .Mr. llet·tig'~ vehicle would have been 1-!.7
feet pE'r second or that 81;2 seconds were required to
travel the 125 feet from the stop sign to where the turn
began as shown on Exhibit 9-D. Mr. Muhlbach admitted
that he was going 40 miles per hour as he approached
the intersection (R. 148). He also stated that he had
better than average reactions (R. 165). Therefore, Sgt.
Pitcher stated that assuming Mr. Muhlbach was going
40 miles per hour on the Cottonwood Diagonal, that the
roadway was dry, and that there were no loose materials
on it and the the drag-factor wa~ .S-!, from his studies
and tests he had found a truck could stop in 63¥2 feet
of braking and 4-1.1 feet of reaction time during a4 of
a second reaction time and that the total stopping distance was 107 feet. Sgt. Pitcher also said that a truck
going ..J.O miles per hour would be going 58.8 feet per
second and that in 8¥2 seconds the truck would have
been 499.8 feet from the place where the turn was
started by Mr. Hertig at the time .Mr. Hertig left
the stop sign (R. 245). Subtracting the stopping distance of 107 feet or the total distance the truck was
from where Mr. Hertig turned or fram the 499.8 feet,
Sgt. Pitcher found that there was a difference of
392 feet or that there was 1nargin of safety in stopping
on the part of l\Ir. Muhlbach, if he had been loaking, of
392 feet. In Richards vs. Anderson, supra, the plaintiff
was found contributorily negligent as a matter of law
in not stopping in a margin of safety of 78 feet. If you
divide 78 feet into 392 feet, you will find it will go 5

27
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times with a slight remainder and it would appear that
Mr. Muhlbach was five times as negligent as Mr. Richards who was found to be contributorily negligent as a
matter of law in Richards vs. Anderson, supr,a. Section
41-6-144 Utah Code Annotated as amended 1961, declares
a minimum standard for braking efficency. Using this
factor Sgt. Pitcher computed Mr. Muhlbaeh's required
stopping distance on the theory that he had only miniInurn standard brakes, and not good brakes, and found
that even with a minimum of 40 miles per hour using%
of a second for reaction time that he could have braked
to a complete stop in 166.7 feet. Subtracting this disance from 499.8 feet gave Mr. Muhlbach a margin of
safety in stopping of 333.1 feet at 1\fr. Muhlbaeh's most
favorable speed of 40 miles per hour.
It is submitted that if Mr. Muhlbach had been keeping a lookout and had seen what was plain to be seen,
he could have safely slowed or stopped and that Mr.
Hertig's vehicle was not an "immediate hazard" at
the time Mr. Muhlbach was approaching the intersection.
Further, it is submitted that in actuality, Mr. Muhlbach
did not have to stop his truck, but n1erely had to slow
it to a speed of 15 miles per hour, that in fact he had
a margin of safety in avoiding an upset in his truck of
much greater than 333 feet. Since 1\tfr. Hertig had turned
and was proceeding down the diagonal in the same direction that Mr. Muhlhach was going at a speed of at least
15 miles per hour at the time of the turn, to avoid danger
the truck needed to be slowed only to 15 miles per hour
to avoid danger. If Mr. Muhlbach's truck was an imme-
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diate hazard at the time :\1 r. Hertig l<>ft the ~top sign to
go to the intPr~P<'tion, it is submitted all driver~ entPring intPr~Pctions from stop signs do so at their peril and
that the driver on the arterial has no duty to keep a
lookout or see what is plain to be seen at an unobstructed
int<·r~Petion and that thr driver on the arterial in fact
has an absolute right of way.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT EACH DRIVER HAD A DUTY TO
KEEP A LOOKOUT AND THAT IT WAS NEGLIGENCE TO
FAIL TO SEE WHAT WAS PLAIN TO BE SEEN.

In requested Instruction N" o. 16 Mr. Hertig requested
the court ·as follows: (R. 68)
INSTRUCTION NO. 16
"You are instructed that the driver on an
arterial highway has the duty to remain reasonably alert to the possibility that a driver entering
the ·arterial highway at an intersection may believe that he can enter in safety.
"The duty to keep a proper lookout applies to
each driver, and neither driver can excuse his
failure to observe the other driver because that
other driver failed to observe him.
"Failure to see what is plain to be seen is
'negligence'."
Requested Instruction No. 14 which was refused (R.
66) is as follows:
INSTRFCTIOK NO. 14
"Where the driver of a truck has ample time

29
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to observe a motorist entering the through highway and fails to do so in time to avoid an accident, the driver of the truck is guilty of contributory negligence."
In this case Mr. Muhlbach admitted to Officer Iba
and did not deny his statement in court that he did not
see the danger of the vehicle ahead until he was 30 feet
from Mr. Hertig's automobile (R. 181). At the time he
made his observation J\~Ir. Muhlbach said he was going
35 or 40 miles per hour. Sgt. Pitcher's testimony shows
that in 30 feet at 40 miles per hour ~ir. ~Iuhlbach could
not stop. The pictorial Exhibits 2-D, 4-D and 6-D and all
of the testimony showed the intersection was unobstructed. Visibility was good according to Mr. Muhlbach
and it is apparent that if he had been observing Mr. Hertig's vehicle he would have had an ample margin of
safety in which to slow or stop his truck. It seems reasonable that when requested Instructions 14 and 16, and
they were not given, that the jurors assun1ed that the
driver on the arterial had no duty to see what \Vas plain
to be seen or to keep a lookout and that the jury, in view
of the emergency doctrine instruction given, assumed
that Mr. Hertig entered the intersection at his peril.
The requested instructions were based on the prineiples set forth in Dalley vs . .i.llid-lV estern Dairy Products Company (1932), 80 Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 309. In
Dalley vs. Mid- Western Dairy Products Company, the
court said:
"In this jurisdiction the doctrine is established that it is negligence as a matter of law
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for a person to drive an automobile upon a
traveled public highway, used by vehicles and
pedestrians, at such .a rate of speed that said
automobile can not be stopped within the distance
at which the operator of said car is able to see
objects upon the highway in front of him."
The evidence is clear that Mr. Muhlb.ach was nearly
in the intersection before he took evasive action, and in
fact he said he did not see the danger of Mr. Hertig's
automobile until he was 30 feet from it.
From the instructions given it appears the jury
did not believe Mr. Muhlbach was required to slow to
stop his vehicle within the distance he could see objects
in the intersection, and in fact it seems that the jury
thought he was excused from looking until he was 30 feet
away from Mr. Hertig.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE
SHOWED AS A MATTER OF LAW THE PLAINTIFF WAS
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO KEEP
THE RIGHT OF WAY AND IN FAILING TO KEEP A
PROPER LOOKOUT.

In Johnson vs. Syme (1957), 6 Utah 2d 319, 313 P.
2d 468, where the plaintiff was traveling north in the
inside lane on U.S. 91, .a four-lane highway, at a speed
of 50 miles per hour, at 11 :00 p.m. and was acquainted
with the area, and where, as she approached the intersection, the plaintiff had an unobstructed view to the
east, and where the defendant's vehicle was traveling
west at a speed of 40 miles per hour and did not slow
down for the stop sign facing east at the South Draper
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road, and where the plaintiff failed to see the decedent's
vehicle until it was directly in front of her at a distance
of 20 or 30 feet, a summary judgment in favor of the
defend~nt against the plaintiff on the arterial was affirmed, our court saying that the plaintiff either failed
to look or failed to look and see the obvious, and as such,
was contributorly negligent.
In Conklin vs. Walsh (1948), 113 Utah 276, 193 P.
2d 437, our court said that a driver traveling on the
arterial had a duty to remain reasonably alert to the
possibility that the disfavored driver may believe he
can cross safely, and if the favored driver entering an
arterial intersection does not look, he is negligent as a
matter of law.
In Martin v.s. Ehlers (1962), 13 litah 2d 236, 271 P.
2d 851, in a case involving an intersection collision in
Salt Lake City, where the plaintiff failed to hear a
plainly audible siren, according to the testimony of other
witnesses, and where he also failed to see the lights on
the police vehicle, and where the plaintiff did not reduce
his speed as he approached the intersection, and neither
driver saw the other except momentarily before coUision,
this court held the plaintiff contributorily negligent as
a matter of law, saying when he does not hear what is
plainly audible to others, he is not immune ~rom his
actions simply because he asserts that he did not hear
anything as audible as a police siren, and if he fails to
hear the siren or see what was plain to be seen, he is
contributorily negligent.
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In Bullock l's. Lllke (1940), 98 l~tah 501, 98 P. :2d
::.->11, this court said that where there was unob~trueted
1nh·r~Pdion and where a motorcyclist did not observe for
a distance of 800 to 1200 feet, he is negligent as a matter
of law for failing to look and realize that the driver
on the left was not going to yield the right-of-way.
In lllorris v:;. Chri:;fensell (1960), 11 Ctah :2d 1-ll,
356 P. 2d 3-t, this court said it was the duty of a driver
to observe and to see what there is to see so as to e·xereise ordinary precaution for his own safety. This duty
extends to the favored driver with the right-of-way, but
he who has the right-of-way need not anticipate negligence on the part of another driver.
In Bates vs. Burns (1955 ), 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P. 2d
290, where the evidence showed the plaintiff stopped at
a stop sign 125 feet south of the point of impact and
then proceeded northward into the intersection and
thereafter collided with a west bound vehicle on Highway
91 at the intersection of Highway 114 in Pleasant Grove,
Utah and where the evidence showed the plaintiff proceeded at a speed of 5 to 6 1niles per hour from the stop
sign to the center of the highway, and where, in fact the
plaintiff not only entered the intersection first but nearly
had passed over it before the defendant entered, the court
said the plaintiff was a disfavored driver until he had
entered the intersection at a time when no car on the
through highway had entered the intersection or was so
close as to constitute an immediate hazard, but having
entered as authorized, he became the favored driver, and
all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said
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through highway were obliged to yield the right of way
to him.
Section 41-6-74 as amended in 1961 is as follows:
"VEHICLE ENTERING A THROUGH
HIGHWAY. The driver of a vehicle shall stop
as required by this act at the entrance to a
through highway and shall yield the right of way
to other vehicles which have entered the intersection from said through highway or which are
approaching so closely on said through highway
as to constitute an immediate hazard, but said
driver having so yielded may proceed and the
drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said through highway shall yield
the right of way to the vehicle so proceeding into
or across the through highway.
"(b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise
stop in obedience to a stop sign as required herein
at an intersection where a stop sign is erected
at one or more entrances thereto although not a
part of a through highway and shall proceed cautiously, yielding right of way to vehicles not so
obliged to stop which are within the intersection
or approaching so closely as to constitute an
immediate hazard, but may then proceed."
The 1961 amendment substituted the words "yield
right of way" for the word "yielding" in Sub Section (b),
a~d except for this change there has been no modification~ in. Sections 41-6-74 since Bates us. B·urns, supra,
was decided. In 1961 Section ±1-6-7 ±.10 was added, but
the rules set forth in that statute seemed to have no
application, as in this case there was no collision between
the vehicles involved, and further it would appear Sub34
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~t'd ion

(b) of ~P<·tion -ll-G-7 -l.lO has no application as
tiH' evidence in thi:-: case shows that there is a n1argin
or ~arcty in stopping of over 333 feet in which ~lr. i\l"uhlbach could have :-:toppPd or slowed his truC'k and as ~urh,
unless the driver entering from the stop sign enters an
intPrsection entirPl~· at his peril, under section 41-fii 4.10, Mr. Hertig had the right of way as did l\Ir. Bates
in Bates cs. BHrns, supra.
In Ben . .·on cs. D.&R.G.W. Railroad Company (1955),
4 Utah 2d 39, 296 P. 2d 790, a case where an action
wa~ brought by a motorist in a train-auto collision
which occurred in X ove1nber 1948 during the night in
a bad snow stonn at a railroad crossing at 2nd ~outh
and 6th West in Salt LakE' Cit~·, Utah, where the plaintiff testified he was going west at 15 to 20 miles per
hour, and that his visibility was 25 to 30 feet, and
that the train 'vas going south at 5 to 6 miles per
hour and where the engine was struck on the left center by the plaintiff's vehicle and where at 15 miles
per hour the plaintiff would have traveled 16¥2 feet
during 3A, second reaction time, and 18 feet after
brakes were applied, and thus a total stopping distance
of 341/2 feet would have been required, the plaintiff was
held contributorily negligent as a matter of law in driving at a speed that he could not stop within the distance
he could see objects on the highway.
In Hirschbach cs. Dubuque Packing Company
(1957), 7 Utah 2d 7, 316 P. 2d 319, where a collision occured four miles west of Knolls, Utah on Highway 40
on a straight and level stretch and where just prior to
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the collision the plaintiff driver was traveling west ~
miles per hour with good visibility and where his hea
lights would disclose vehicles at a distance of 350 fee
and where his brakes were working properly and whei
he observed defendant's vehicle in sufficient time to hav
stopped but did not do so because he was under the in
pression it was moving in the same direction as he wa
traveling, and that after he discovered it was stopped i
was too late to stop, this court followed Dalley vs. Mia
Western Da.iry Products Company, supra, and, affirme'
a summary judgment granted by the trial court in favo
of the defendant.
In Shiba vs. Weis.s (1958) 3 Utah 2d 256, 282 P. 2(
341, the court found as a matter of law the driver of th~
plaintiff's vehicle was negligent in being able to sto]
within the range of his vision where the accident hap
pened on a stretch of Highway 40 a few miles west o:
Strawberry Reservoir and where there was no- evidenc(
of any obstruction to the view of the driver, where th(
facts were very similar to Dalley vs. Mid-Western Dair~
Products Compan.y, supra.
In summary it is submitted Mr. Muhlbach havin~
admitted to Mr. Iba (R. 181) that he did not observ(
the danger of this thing until he was 30 feet from Mr
Hertig's automobile, that he is negligent as a matter o:
law in not keeping a proper lookout. Further as the evi
dence shows Mr. Muhlbach's vehicle was 499.8 feet at hi1
most favorable speed from the place where Mr. Herti~
started his left turn to go northwest on the diagonal a
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tlw time Mr. Hertig left tiH· stop sign. ~~ r. ~~ uhlbach wa:-:
negligent ·as a matter of law in failing to yield the right
of way.
CONCLUSION
The judgment in the lower court 1n favor of the
plaintiff should be vacated and the lower court should
be directed to enter a judgment of "No Cause of Action"
in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff
N.O.Y., or if this court does not direct the lower court
to enter a judgment in favor of the defendant then the
lower court should be instructed to grant the defendant
a new trial on proper instructions.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYl\10ND l\1. BERRY,
203 Executive Building
455 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant, Appellant
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